Mercer Law Review
Volume 50
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 11

7-1999

Federal Sentencing Guidelines
James T. Skuthan
Rosemary T. Cakmis

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Skuthan, James T. and Cakmis, Rosemary T. (1999) "Federal Sentencing Guidelines," Mercer Law Review:
Vol. 50 : No. 4 , Article 11.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol50/iss4/11

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by James T. Skuthan*
and
Rosemary T. Cakmis**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit decided several cases this past year covering a
broad range of United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") issues.'
Two areas of particular concern were firearms and departures.
Due to the 1995 Supreme Court decision in Bailey v. United States,2
several defendants had their firearm convictions vacated and were
resentenced. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in 1998 was faced with
reviewing these resentencings to determine the applicability of guideline
enhancements for firearms.
The court also decided several cases relating to downward departures
based on cultural differences,' a defendant's impulse control disorder,4
the over-representation of a career offender's prior record,5 and the

* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division.
Auburn University (B.A., 1980); Florida State University (J.D., 1985). Member, The
Florida Bar; United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida; Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Skuthan is also board certified by The Florida Bar in the
area of criminal trial practice. He lectures annually at the Florida Bar Board Certification
seminar on federal sentencing guideline issues, and he organizes the annual Federal C.J.A.
Practice seminar for the Middle District of Florida. He is on the Board of Directors of the
Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Central Florida Criminal Defense
Attorneys Association.
** Assistant Federal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division.
University of Florida (B.S., 1979; J.D., 1981). Member, The Florida Bar; United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida; Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Ms.
Cakmis has lectured on Eleventh Circuit Case Law.
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINESMANUAL [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
2. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
3. United States v. Tomono, 143 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1998).
4. United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1998).
5. United States v. Webb, 139 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1998).
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resolution of sentencing disparities when co-offenders receive a more
lenient sentence in the state system.6 Although the holding in Koon v.
United States7 directs that a district judge's departure decision is
subject to an abuse of discretion review, the court reversed most of the
downward departure reductions in 1998. As departure requests get
more creative, we can expect to see the Eleventh Circuit devoting more
time each year to resolving departures in both directions.
II.

A.

1998 SENTENCING GUIDELINES DECISIONS FROM THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Chapter One: Introduction and GeneralApplication Principles

1. U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.2: Actual Conduct
Section 1B1.2 application note 3 provides the court may consider the
actual conduct of a defendant in certain circumstances, even though that
conduct is not an element of the offense. The Government tried to use
this provision in United States v. Saavedra' to justify an enhancement
under U.S.S.G. section 2D1.2, in which defendant had admitted that the
drug offense occurred within one thousand feet of a school, but was not
specifically charged under 21 U.S.C. § 860.? The Eleventh Circuit
rejected the actual conduct argument, noting that application note 3
explains:
the court may consider "actual conduct" in four situations: (a) when an
offender stipulates certain facts in plea agreement, (b) when the court
considers the applicability of certain offense characteristics within
individual guidelines, (c) when it considers various adjustments, and
(d) when it considers whether or not to depart from the guidelines for
reasons relating to offense conduct. 0
Although defendant admitted at the sentencing hearing that he sold
drugs within one thousand feet of a school, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the admission could not be used against him under the "actual
conduct" prong of the guidelines because he never formally stipulated to
this fact."
6. United States v. Willis, 139 F.3d 811 (11th Cir. 1998).
7. 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996).
8. 148 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 1998).
9. Id. at 1313 (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 860 (West Supp. 1998)). As discussed in more
detail below, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the U.S.S.G. section 2D1.2 enhancement because
defendant was not charged under section 860. Id. at 1318.
10. 148 F.3d at 1318 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 application n.3).

11. Id.
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2. U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.3(a)(1): Relevant Conduct
In United States v. Exarhos,2 the majority held that the district
court erred in failing to consider reliable hearsay evidence showing that
defendant stole other cars, which should have been included as relevant
conduct under U.S.S.G. sections 2B6.1 and 2F1.1.' s The court held that
the district court should have counted uncharged conduct directly
involving the closely related thefts of motor vehicles. 4
3. U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.3(a)(2): Relevant Conduct
5 the court held that importation
In United States v. Perulena,"
of
marijuana that occurred almost a year before defendant joined the drug
smuggling conspiracy was not conduct for which defendant could be held
"otherwise accountable" under the sentencing guidelines. 6
The
importation of marijuana was beyond the scope of criminal activity
that
7
defendant agreed to jointly undertake with co-conspirators.1

B.

Chapter Two: Offense Conduct

1. Part D: Drug Offenses
a. U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1: Crack Cocaine versus Powder Cocaine.
The sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine remains
enormous. In United States v. Hanna," the court rejected another
challenge to the 100:1 penalty ratio. 9 Then, in United States v.
Riley2 ° the court held that the type of cocaine involved (crack versus
powder) is a sentencing issue. 21 Defendants in Riley were indicted for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack and powder cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).22 The jury returned a general verdict
of guilty. Neither defendant requested a special verdict on which
substances were involved in the offenses. Defendants were then

12.
13.

135 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 730.

14. Id.
15.
16.

146 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1336-38.

17. Id.
18. 153 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 1998).
19. Id. at 1288-89. Pursuant to the drug quantity table, one gram of crack cocaine
carries the same base offense level as one hundred grams of powder cocaine. U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c).
20. 142 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1998).
21. Id. at 1256.

22. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994).
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sentenced according to the amounts of powder and crack attributed to
them by their presentence reports.23
On appeal, defendants challenged their sentences based on the
absence of a special verdict or a finding beyond a reasonable doubt on
whether the offenses involved powder cocaine or crack cocaine. Because
defendants failed to preserve the issues in the district court, the
appellate court applied the plain error analysis.24 The Eleventh Circuit
held that under the law of that circuit, the indictment's use of "and"
between crack and powder permits conviction for an offense involving
either one. 25 Relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in Edwards
v. United States,6 the court then held that the district court could
impose a sentence based on the amount of both crack cocaine and
cocaine powder involved in defendants' offenses and that the district
court was not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt whether
defendants' conspiracy involved cocaine powder, crack cocaine, or both
prior to imposing sentence.2 7

b. U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1): Enhancement for Possessing a
FirearmDuringa Drug Offense. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) provides for a twolevel enhancement if a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) is
possessed during a drug offense. In United States v. Trujillo,2 the
Eleventh Circuit upheld a two-level firearm enhancement pursuant to
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) for a defendant who had a gun in a leather pouch in
his warehouse office next to the room where the cocaine was found.2
The enhancement in this case is interesting because the gun was found
in a separate office area of the warehouse that did not contain any
drugs. Defendant argued that because he had a concealed weapons
permit, he could legally possess the gun.80 The court rejected this
argument, finding that the gun was available to defendant in case
something went wrong with the drug transaction.3 ' In other words,
because defendant was using the gun for an illegal purpose, the fact that
defendant had a concealed weapons permit was irrelevant.32

23. 142 F.3d at 1255.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1256.
26. 118 S. Ct. 1475 (1998).
27. 142 F.3d at 1256-57.
28. 146 F.3d 838 (11th Cir. 1998).

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 847.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This two-level enhancement has been especially troublesome in the
wake of the United States Supreme Court decision in Bailey v. United
States.33 Since the Court in Bailey defined the term "use" as found in
18 U.S.C. § 924(c),34 a number of section 924(c) convictions have been
reversed. However, many of those cases also involved drug convictions
that were not disturbed by the ruling in Bailey.
One example is United States v.Oliver.s5 Prior to the Supreme Court
decision in Bailey, defendants in Oliver had been convicted of federal
drug offenses and of using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
offense (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Defendants successfully challenged their
section 924(c) convictions in light of Bailey. However, once the section
924(c) conviction was vacated, the Government moved for resentencing
and requested a two-level upward adjustment based upon section
2D1.1(b)(1). 36

The district court agreed with the Government and

enhanced defendant's drug sentence after applying section 2D1.1
(b)(1). 37 Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to resentence him. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying
on United States v. Mixon.3 1 In Mixon the court held that "based on
the language of § 2255 and the interdependence of the multiple counts
for sentencing purposes," a district court has jurisdiction to recalculate
a defendant's entire sentence, and such resentencing does not defeat the
defendant's double jeopardy rights.39
United States v. Watkins 4° took the decision in Mixon one step
further. In Watkins defendant was originally sentenced as an armed
career criminal with regard to the count charging him with possessing
three firearms. 41 His armed career criminal status trumped any twolevel enhancement on the drug count. After vacating defendant's sixtymonth sentence under section 924(c) (and after considering his additional substantial assistance), the district court resentenced defendant to
twenty-four months more than the initial sentence imposed on the drug
and section 924(e) counts, but thirty-six months less than his prior
aggregate sentence (the total sentence for the section 924(e), drug and
section 924(c) counts).4 2 The Eleventh Circuit held the district court

33. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
34. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 1976 & Supp. 1998).
35. 148 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 1998).
36. Id. at 1275.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing United States v. Mixon, 115 F.3d 900 (11th Cir. 1997)).
39. 115 F.3d at 903-04 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998)).
40. 147 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1998).
41. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West Supp. 1998).
42. 147 F.3d at 1295-96.
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had jurisdiction to resentence the defendant on the unchallenged drug
and section 924(e) counts and that the resentencing did not violate
defendant's double jeopardy or due process rights.43
c. U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.2: Enhancement for Drugs within One
Thousand Feet of a School. In Saavedra defendant successfully
challenged his two-level enhancement, pursuant to section 2D1.2, for
selling drugs within one thousand feet of a school." The indictment
alleged that defendant conspired with others to distribute controlled
substances in Miami Springs, Florida.4 r The indictment did not refer
to 21 U.S.C. § 860 (possession with the intent to distribute drugs within
one thousand feet of a school) and did not mention that defendant's
criminal actions took place within one thousand feet of an elementary
school. Nonetheless, the district court enhanced defendant's base offense
level by two levels for selling drugs within one thousand feet of a
school.4 s
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court and held that
section 2D1.2 was not an enhancement guideline and that the guideline
enhancement applied only to those cases in which defendant was
charged under section 860. 4" Because the offenses in this case were
charged under section 846 and section 841, the proper guideline was
section 2D1.1.
2. Part F: Offenses Involving Fraud or Deceit
The decision of which guideline to apply can significantly affect the
sentence, particularly in cases involving loss. The theft guideline,
U.S.S.G. section 2B1.1, is seemingly more simple to apply. The fraud
guideline, U.S.S.G. section 2F1.1, is more complicated and can render a
more harsh result inasmuch as it implicates the intended loss as well as
the actual loss.
In United States v. Tatum, s the guideline application note relating
to fraudulent contract procurement cases, not the theft guideline (section
2B1.1), was held to be applicable in sentencing defendant for conspiracy 49 and making false statements' for the purpose of influencing the

43. Id. at 1297-98.
44. 21 U.S.C.A. § 860 (West Supp. 1998).
45. Id. § 846 (1981 & Supp. 1998).

46. 148 F.3d at 1312-13 &n.2, 1314. For additional discussion of Saavedra,see supra
text accompanying notes 8-11.
47. Id. at 1318.

48. 138 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1998).
49. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 1966 & Supp. 1998).
50. Id. § 1007 (West Supp. 1998).
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") in the procurement of
a management contract.51 Thus, the sentencing court was required to
consider the actual loss suffered by FDIC and the loss intended by
defendants, not merely the gross amount of funds connected with the
crimes.
Similarly, in United States v. Bald5 2 defendant made unauthorized
credit card purchases with her employer's credit card, which had been
entrusted to her. Defendant argued that the loss figure should be the
net loss after crediting defendant for returned merchandise because
those credit card charges were reversed.53
The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed and held that the return of the merchandise did not diminish
the intended loss from the improper charges.54 The court cited section
2F1. 1, application note 7, which states that "if an intended loss that the
defendant was attempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will
be used 'if it is greater than' the actual loss."55 In the instant case, the
intended loss was greater than the actual loss.56
In addition to dealing with intended loss, the fraud guideline is
complicated by the concept of "more than minimal planning."5 7 In
United States v. Daniels,5" defendant pleaded guilty to the crimes of
embezzlement" and false statements.5 0 On appeal defendant argued
that his base offense level should not have been enhanced for more than
minimal planning and that the district court should have reduced the
amount of the loss by the amount reimbursed by his insurance
carrier. 6' The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. 62 As to the loss amount,
the court held that reimbursement does not change the amount
defendant embezzled; it only substitutes the victim's insurance company
as another victim.' The court also upheld the enhancement for more
than minimal planning, finding that the charged embezzlement occurred

51. 138 F.3d at 1346-47 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 application n.7).
52. 132 F.3d 1414 (11th Cir. 1998).
53. Id. at 1415.
54. Id. at 1416-17.
55. Id. at 1416 n.4 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 application n.7).
56. Id. at 1416-17.
57. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(bX2)(A). For a definition of "more than minimal planning," see
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 application n.l(F).

58.
59.

148 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 1998).
18 U.S.C.A. § 643 (West 1976 & Supp. 1998).

60.

Id. § 1014 (West Supp. 1998).

61. 148 F.3d at 1261.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1262.
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over a five-year period and constituted "'repeated acts'" over a period of
time."
3. U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2: Offenses Involving Prostitution,
Sexual Exploitation of Minors, and Obscenity
The trend in child pornography cases in the Eleventh Circuit seems to
be toward increasingly harsh sentences. The court has upheld enhancements in these cases and reversed at least one downward departure.
5 defendant was convicted
In United States v. Thcker,"
of transporting
in interstate commerce material depicting minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct." At sentencing, his base offense level was enhanced
four levels for material that portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct,
or other depictions of violence.67 The court stated intent is a necessary
requirement for the four-level enhancement under this specific offense
characteristic.'
Here, the sentencing court's finding of intent was
supported by two types of evidence: (1) pictures of minors in bondage
located on the hard drive of defendant's computer, and (2) Internet
conversations showing that while looking for pictures, defendant stated
that he was into "young action" and would "like to start trading" and
documenting his trading of these images.69
In United States v. Anderton,7 ° defendant was charged with possessing a sexually explicit videotape depicting a minor.71 The district court
applied a five-level enhancement, finding that the specific offense
characteristic of a defendant engaging in a pattern of activity involving
the sexual abuse of exploitation of a minor applied.7 2 Defendant
argued that the guideline pertained only to conduct occurring during the
course of the offense of conviction.7" However, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the 1996 guideline amendment was clarifying and that "'[it is
now well-settled in this circuit that "the sentencing court should consider
clarifying amendments when interpreting the guidelines, even when

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1261 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1BI.1 application n.l(F)).
136 F.3d 763 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 763-64 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1998)).
Id. at 764 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)).
Id. (citing United States v. Cole, 61 F.3d 24 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Id.
136 F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 748 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)).
Id. at 750 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)).
Id.
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sentencing
defendants convicted before the effective date of the amend74
ments.""
In another computer pornography case, United States v. Miller,75 the
court reversed the district court's downward departure for "diminished
mental capacity."76 The district court had based the departure on
defendant's impulse control disorder.7 The appellate court held that
this disorder did not take the case outside the heartland of cases, did not
justify the downward departure, and was not linked to commission of the
offense.78
4. U.S.S.G. Section 2J1.7: Offenses Involving the Administration
of Justice
In United States v. Bozza, 79 the court interpreted the notice requirement for the consecutive sentence enhancement found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3147 and U.S.S.G. section 2J1.7.s° Defendant's sentence was enhanced pursuant to those provisions because the charged offenses were
committed while defendant was released on bond in an unrelated
case. s" The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sentence because defendant
had notice of the enhancement prior to the sentencing hearing and had
the opportunity to object.8 2 Aligning itself with the Tenth Circuit83
and rejecting the position of the Fifth Circuit, 4 the Eleventh Circuit
held that section 2J1.7 does not require a district court to notify the
defendant of the sentencing enhancement prior to accepting a guilty
plea.'M

74. Id. at 751 (quoting United States v. Howard, 923 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991)
(quoting United States v. Matin, 916 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990))).
75. 146 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1998).
76. Id. at 1283 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13).
77. Id. at 1284-85.
78. Id. at 1285-86.

79. 132 F.3d 659 (11th Cir. 1998).
80. Id. at 660.
81. Id. Defendant was charged with impersonating a federal officer, 18 U.S.C.A. § 912
(West 1976 & Supp. 1998), and travel fraud, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314 (West 1970 & Supp. 1998).
132 F.3d at 660.
82. 132 F.3d at 661.
83. See United States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 1995).
84. See United States v. Pierce, 5 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1993).
85. 132 F.3d at 661.
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Offenses Involving Public Safety

United States v. Flennory"6 offers a good lesson for those who are not
thoroughly familiar with the cross-referencing of criminal statutes when
doing guidelines calculations. In this firearm case, defendant pleaded
guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon ("felon
in possession")87 and to one count of using a firearm in relation to a
drug trafficking offense.8" The Government dropped the three remaining counts-one count of possessing a firearm by a convicted felon and
two counts of drug trafficking.89 At sentencing, defendant's base
offense level on the felon in possession count was calculated pursuant to
section 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). 9 This guideline provides that if a defendant
uses or possesses any guns with the commission or attempted commission of another offense, the base offense level of the other offense is
applied if the resulting offense level is greater. Because two of the
dismissed counts charged drug offenses, the probation office crossreferenced to the drug offenses to determine the offense level for the
felon in possession count. The drug guidelines were then used to
sentence defendant on the felon in possession count because they were
greater than the applicable firearm guidelines.9
The court also
imposed a five-year consecutive sentence on the section 924(c) charge.92
The Eleventh Circuit found it was proper to base the sentence on the
entire amount of drugs involved in the offense even though the drug
counts in the case were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. 93
In United States v. Paredes,' the court found that the offense level
for the felon in the possession conviction95 was properly enhanced
under the specific offense characteristic of possessing a firearm in
connection with another felony offense because the firearm in question
was possessed in connection with a robbery. 96

86.
87.
88.

145 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1998).
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1998).
Id. § 924(c) (1994).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

145 F.3d at 1265, 1266.
Id. at 1265-67.
Id.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1269.
139 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 1998).
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1).
139 F.3d at 845-46 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5)).
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6. U.S.S.G. Section 2L1.2: Offenses Involving Immigration,
Naturalization, and Passports
Upon being convicted of re-entering the country following deportation," alien/defendant in United States v. Lazo-Ortiz98 received an
enhanced sentence because of prior convictions for an "aggravated
felony."99 Even though the date of the "prior" offense in this case
preceded the effective date of the statutory definition of "aggravated
felony," the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that the
guideline definition controlled the guideline enhancement.' °
Similarly, in United States v. Lozano' defendant was deported after
being convicted of an "aggravated felony."" 2 He was later prosecuted
for illegally re-entering the United States.' °3 Defendant challenged the
"aggravated felony" enhancement for the illegal re-entry guideline under
the Ex Post Facto Clause because the prosecution was not in effect when
the prior aggravated felony was committed.'
The Eleventh Circuit
rejected this challenge because defendant was being sentenced for the
crime of illegal re-entry, and the penalties were unambiguous at the
time of the commission of that offense.'0 5
C.

Chapter Three: Adjustments

1. Part B: Role in the Offense
a. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.1: ManagerialRole. The manager/organizer
enhancement, found in section 3B1. 1, is one of the few enhancements for
which Eleventh Circuit case law is favorable to the defense." e In
United States v. Glinton, °7 the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's finding that defendant was a leader or organizer of five or more

97.
98.
99.
note 2,
1998).
100.
101.
102.

8 U.S.C.A. § 1326 (West 1970 & Supp. 1998).
136 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1283 (citingU.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)). Pursuant to section 2L1.2 application
the term "aggravated felony" is defined in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West Supp.
136 F.3d at 1286.
138 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998).
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43).

103. Id. § 1326(a).
104. 138 F.3d at 916 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).
105. Id. at 916-17.
106. See United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Aired, 144 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lozano-Hernandez, 89 F.3d 785
(11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Yates, 990 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1993).
107. 154 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1998).
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participants.0 ° The court reiterated that the supervision or control of
another person is an integral part of a managerial enhancement."° A
defendant who has only a "buyer/seller" relationship with his coconspirators cannot be classified as a leader/organizer."'
Also, in
Alred, a case in which defendent sold and occasionally "fronted" drugs
to others, the court reversed the district court's four-level enhancement
of defendant as an organizer, manager, or leader."'
The impact of the managerial role adjustment is significant. Not only
112
can the managerial adjustment result in a four-level increase,
but
it can also affect the applicability of other guidelines. For example, if a
defendant is enhanced four levels for a managerial role, he is ineligible
11 3
for a reduction under the guidelines "safety valve" provision.
However, if the defendant meets all of the other safety valve criteria, the
elimination of the managerial adjustment also114makes the defendant
eligible for the two-level safety valve reduction.
b.
U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.2: Minor Role. In United States v.
Campbell,"' the district court denied defendant's request for a mitigating role adjustment under section 3B1.2 for two reasons: (1) she had
foregone job opportunities and knowingly imported drugs for money, and
(2) as a courier, the court reasoned, defendant was a minor but
important link in the drug smuggling scheme."' Because both of these
factors related solely to defendant's status as a drug courier, the
Eleventh Circuit held that these factors were improper reasons for
denying defendant a minor role reduction." 7
c. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.3: Use of a Special Skill. In United States
v. Foster,"" a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit held the act
of "printing" counterfeit money constituted a "special skill" for section
3B1.3 enhancement purposes." 9 The court recognized that while

108. Id. at 1260.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Lozano-Hernandez, 89 F.3d at 790).
111. 144 F.3d at 1421-22.
112. U.S.S.G. § 3B.1(a).
113. Id. § 5C1.2. A defendant is ineligible for a two-level "safety valve" reduction if the
defendant is depicted an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense.
Id. § 5C1.2(4).

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.2(4).
139 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 821.
Id. at 822.
155 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1332.
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printing does not require a license or formal education, it is a unique
technical skill that requires special training and that is not possessed by
members of the general public. 12 After finding that "printing" is a
special skill, the court found (as required by the guideline) that the skill
"significantly facilitated" the commission of the offense. 2'
In United States v. Exarhos,2 2 the Eleventh Circuit also held the
ability to find and obliterate vehicle identification numbers from cars
and car parts warranted a two-level upward adjustment under the
"special skill" provision of the guidelines. 12
The court found that
dismantling cars and reassembling them to facilitate distribution of the
stolen cars and parts24"involves a combination of skills not possessed by
the general public."'
d. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.3: Abuse of a Position of Trust. The breach
of trust cases decided in 1998 were factually complicated. In United
States v. Garrison,26 the court reversed the breach of trust enhancement that had been imposed on the president of a home health agency
who had submitted false cost reports to Medicare. 126 The court first
held that a Medicare provider is not, by its mere status, necessarily in
a position of trust in relation to the Medicare program. 127 The home
health care agency in this case submitted cost reports to a fiscal
intermediary, which was required to audit the reports to see if they were
accurate. Further, defendant was not a financial expert, but rather a
nurse-turned-entrepreneur.
It was apparent that no one at the
intermediary company looked to defendant for assurance on the accuracy
of the financial reports. 21 Second, the court held the abuse of trust
enhancement could not stand because it covered the same conduct
charged in the indictment."
In United States v. Mills,' the court held the abuse of trust enhancement is "not appropriate unless the victim of the breach itself
conferred the trust."'3 ' In this case defendants were convicted of

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
135 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 730-31 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3).
Id. at 730.

125.

133 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 1998).

126. Id. at 853.
127. Id. at 841.
128. Id. at 841-42 & n.19.
129. Id. at 842-43.
130. 138 F.3d 928 (11th Cir. 1998).
131. Id. at 941 (citing Garrison, 133 F.3d at 844-46).
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submitting falsified documents to the government 18 2 and mail
fraud.'3 3 The court held the Medicare-funded care provider owned by
defendants did not occupy a position of trust vis-&-vis Medicare.'3
Defendants could not be enhanced based on any breach of public trust
by lying to Medicare.' 35 The United States was the only possible
victim of the Medicare fraud crime committed by these defendants, who
were majority shareholders in the Medicare-funded care provider.'
Thus, defendants' abuse of their positions of private trust as officers of
the provider was irrelevant to the breach of trust enhancement at
sentencing.3 7
2. U.S.S.G Section 3C1.1: Obstruction
In United States v. Hubert,'38 the court upheld a two-level enhancement for obstruction ofjustice based upon defendant's alleged perjury at
his bond hearings and trial. 3 In so doing, the court rejected defendant's argument that the sentencing court did not make sufficiently
detailed findings on the perjury.1' ° Rather, the court held that because
the district court adopted the pre-sentence report, which spelled out the
peijurious statements, detailed findings at the sentencing hearing were
not necessary."'
3. U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1: Acceptance of Responsibility
In United States v. Starks,14 2 the Government cross-appealed the
district court's finding that defendant accepted responsibility in
accordance with section 3E 1.1.3

Defendant cooperated with the

government investigation but went to trial to preserve his legal position
regarding the applicability of the antikickback provisions of the Social
Security Act 4 to his conduct. 45 He admitted all the conduct prohibited by statute but denied having the intent to induce referrals, which

132. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 1976 & Supp. 1998).
133. Id. § 1341 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
134. 138 F.3d at 941.

135. Id.
136. Id.

137. Id.
138. 138 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1998).
139. Id. at 915.

140. Id.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 835.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
157 F.3d at 840-41.
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was an essential element of the crime.' 46 The Eleventh Circuit held
that defendant's arguments at trial and on appeal amounted to a factual
denial of guilt and, therefore, were inconsistent with acceptance of
responsibility. 147
Based on similar reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district
court's denial of acceptance of responsibility in United States v.
Hernandez' because defendant
admitted his guilt but not certain
149
parts of his criminal conduct.

Although getting the first two points for acceptance of responsibility
is no easy task, once that is accomplished, the third point appears to be
easier. In United States v. Johnson,5 ° the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the district court's denial of the third point for acceptance of responsibility. 5' Although the district court indicated defendant had accepted
responsibility, it only granted him a two-level reduction because of a
sentencing dispute over the drug amount. 5 ' The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that the district court could only limit its consideration
of the third point to whether defendant timely provided information to
the authorities
or timely notified the authorities of his intention to plead
15
guilty.

D.

ChapterFour: CriminalHistory and Criminal Livelihood

1. Part A. Criminal History
a. U.S.S.G. Section 4A1.1. Pursuant to the criminal history section
of the federal sentencing guidelines, a prior conviction for which the
defendant was sentenced to more than thirteen months incarceration is
scored as three criminal history points.'"M
In United States v.
Glover,'55 the Eleventh Circuit ultimately reversed a sentence because
56
defendant's prior state court conviction was improperly counted.
Defendant in Glover had a prior conviction for which he received
probation. He later violated probation and was sentenced to ninety days

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
160 F.3d 661 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 667-68.
132 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 631-32 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1).
Id. at 631.
153. Id. (citing United States v. McPhee, 108 F.3d 287, 289 (11th Cir. 1997)).
154.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a).

155. 154 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1998).
156. Id. at 1296.
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in jail. After serving the ninety-day sentence, defendant again violated
probation and was sentenced to 364 days with credit for the days already
served. The federal probation office counted the total sentence as 454
days and gave defendant three criminal history points because the total
amount of time defendant was sentenced to was more than thirteen
months.'57 The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the district
court erred in counting the ninety-day time period twice and that the
total sentence imposed was 364 days. 58
The Eleventh Circuit also reversed the criminal history computation
in United States v. Pielago.159 As a matter of first impression, the
court held that a defendant's prior term of confinement in a community
treatment center was not a "sentence of imprisonment" for purposes of
determining his criminal history category under the federal sentencing
guidelines. 60
Thus, a defendant who serves his entire previous
sentence in a community treatment center will only receive one criminal
history point regardless of how much time he served at that facility.
b. U.S.S.G. Section 4A1.2(c)(1). Interpreting a prior record can be
just as perplexing as counting the sentence. Pursuant to the guidelines,
certain listed offenses, and those similar to them, are not included in a
defendant's criminal history calculation.'' The offenses listed in this
section include disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, and failing to
obey a police officer.6 2
In United States v. Horton,"s defendant argued that his prior
misdemeanor assault conviction should not have been scored in
calculating his prior criminal history because that conviction was similar
to the offenses of disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, and failing to
obey a police officer.'64 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that
simple assault was not similar to the offenses listed in section 4A1.2(c)(1) and that the crime was properly scored in defendant's criminal
history calculation at sentencing."
c. U.S.S.G. Section 4A1.3. Section 4A1.3 permits a court to depart
downward or upward from a defendant's prescribed sentence "[ilf reliable

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1292-93.
Id. at 1296.
135 F.3d 703, 713 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1).
Id.
158 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1227-28.
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information indicates that the criminal history category does not
adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal
conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other
Until now, this provision seems to have been relied upon
crimes."'
primarily to justify upward departures when the district court felt the
defendant's criminal history was understated. For example, in United
States v. Mellerson17 the district court departed upward three levels
from defendant's armed career criminal guideline... and gave defen69
dant a life sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.'
The district court reasoned that defendant's criminal history was
understated. 70 Despite the life sentence, the Eleventh Circuit found
17 1
that the upward departure did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
However, such an upward departure must be based on reliable
information. In United States v. Hernandez,72 the district court
departed upward based on section 4A1.3, relying, in part, on defendant's
arrest record as set forth in the pre-sentence report ("PSR).173 The
174
PSR, however, did not specify the conduct175giving rise to the arrests.
The Eleventh Circuit held this was error.
The court in Hernandez also upheld a departure from defendant's
criminal history category based on defendant's violation of the Fair
Because defendant had been
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 7'
charged with deposit account fraud, the district court upwardly departed
one criminal history level because defendant's violation of the FLSA
177
constituted additional similar misconduct on the part of defendant.
The Eleventh Circuit held that section 4A1.3(c) includes conduct other
than criminal misconduct. 17 The court found that "[blecause [defendant's] labor regulations violation was similar to the bankruptcy fraud,
it was well within the court's power to consider this violation in
departing upward."' 79

166.
167.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.
145 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 1998).

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 (bX3)(A).
145 F.3d at 1256 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (g)(1)).
Id.
Id. at 1257.
160 F.3d 661 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 668-70.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 670.
Id.
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Although section 4A1.3 is often relied on to justify an upward
departure, the Eleventh Circuit is not often faced with the situation of
a downward departure under that section. Part of the reason for that
is the general rule that a defendant may not appeal a district court's
refusal to depart downward.'8 ° In United States v. Webb, 8' the
record was ambiguous on whether the district court's decision to depart
downward was based on its belief that it lacked the discretion to grant
defendant's request for a departure." 2 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
resolved this initial issue in favor of the defendant. '8 The court in
Webb then held that section 4A1.3 authorizes the sentencing court to
depart downward regardless of a defendant's status as a career offender
under section 4B1.1.184

2. Criminal Livelihood
a. U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.1: Career Offender. The sentencing
guidelines provide severe enhancements for career offenders and armed
career criminals. The criteria for the career offender enhancement are
that:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the
defendant committed the instant offense of conviction, (2) the instant
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two
prior felony convictions
of either a crime of violence or a controlled
1 85
substance offense.

Whether an offense is a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense within the meaning of this guideline has been addressed by the
Eleventh Circuit in a number of different contexts over the years. In
United States v.Hernandez," the court was asked how to determine
whether the offense defendant was previously convicted of was a
"controlled substance offense" as defined by section 4B1. 1 when the prior
conviction was ambiguous. The prior conviction did not indicate whether
defendant had been convicted for the purchase or sale of drugs.'87 The
difference was critical because a conviction for purchasing drugs does not
qualify as a controlled substance offense under the career offender

180. United States v. Baker, 19 F.3d 605, 614-15 (11th Cir. 1994).

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

139 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1394.
Id. at 1396.
Id.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
145 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1440.
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enhancement."' The Eleventh Circuit held the district court should
not retry the prior convictions and should be limited to examining easily
produced and evaluated court documents, such as any helpful plea
agreements or plea transcripts, any pre-sentence reports adopted by the
sentencing judges, and any findings made by the sentencing judges.8 9
Here, the district court acted improperly in using arrest affidavits to
resolve the ambiguity inasmuch as the inquiry should have concerned
conduct for which defendant was convicted, not conduct for which he was
arrested."
b. U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.4: Armed CareerCriminal. Section 4B1.4(a)
provides that "[a] defendant who is subject to an enhanced sentence
under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) is an armed career criminal." 191 Section 924(e)(1) provides for a significantly enhanced
sentence if the defendant violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three
previous convictions for "a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or
both, committed on occasions different from one another."'9 2 A "serious
drug offense" is defined to include "an offense under State law, involving
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture
or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802)), for which a maximum term
of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law."'93
The Eleventh Circuit was called upon to further interpret "a serious
drug offense" in McCarthy v. United States.'94 Defendant in McCarthy
was enhanced as an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e). Some of defendant's prior "serious drug offenses" included
convictions under Florida law for selling cocaine. The statutory
maximum penalty for the sale of cocaine under Florida law was fifteen
years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that he was sentenced
pursuant to the Florida sentencing guidelines and that under the
guidelines he could not have received more than the presumptive
sentence of four-and-one-half years in prison. Thus, he argued, his prior
convictions could not have been classified as "serious drug offenses" as
that term is defined in section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)' 95 The court of appeals

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a).
18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
135 F.3d 754 (11th Cir. 1998).

195. Id. at 756.
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disagreed, holding that the "only true maximum sentence for the offense
category is the statutory maximum. "19
In United States v. Pope,197 defendant was convicted of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon. 9 The district court refused to enhance
defendant as an armed career criminal.'
It found that two of defendant's burglary convictions, which were committed on the same night,
but in two different buildings two hundred yards away from one another,
should only count as one prior predicate offense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e). 2' The court of appeals reversed, holding that these two prior
burglaries were committed "'on occasions different from one another'"
within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act.20 1
In Mellerson the Eleventh Circuit interpreted section 4B1.4(b)(3)(A),
which provides an additional offense level enhancement if a defendant
uses or possesses a firearm in connection with a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense.20 2 The court held that to apply this
guideline the Government need not prove defendant was convicted of the
crime of violence or controlled substance offense. 2 3 Rather, the
Government need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant used or possessed a firearm in connection with a crime of
.violence or a controlled substance offense.0 4
E. ChapterFive: Determining the Sentence
1. Part C: Imprisonment
In United States v. Reid,2 °5 the Eleventh Circuit held the district
court did not grant a complete and meaningful sentencing hearing on the
issue of whether defendant was entitled to a safety valve reduction
pursuant to section 5C1.2.2° In deciding not to apply the safety valve,
the district court, without hearing argument of counsel, stated only that
it did not apply in this case. 207 The Eleventh Circuit opined that

196. Id. at 757.
197. 132 F.3d 684 (11th Cir. 1998).
198. Id. at 687.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 689.
201. Id. at 692 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1)).
202. 145 F.3d at 1257-58. For additional discussion of Mellerson, see supra text
accompanying notes 167-71.
203. 145 F.3d at 1258.
204. Id.
205. 139 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1998).
206. Id. at 1368.
207. Id.
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"[o]ther than this brief comment," there was nothing in the record on
why the court concluded defendant did not qualify for a safety valve
reduction." 8 The court then remanded for resentencing because
meaningful appellate review on the safety valve issue was precluded by
the lack of any findings by the district court.0 9
2. Part D: Supervised Release
A district court does not have jurisdiction to order deportation as part
of supervised release.21 0 Because this issue relates to the district
court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit can sua sponte
reverse such a condition of supervised release.2 1' However, although
the district court may not order deportation as a condition of supervised
release, it may order that a defendant be surrendered to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for deportation proceedings in accordance with the Immigration and Naturalization Act.212
3. Part E: Restitution
Guidelines restitution is directly related to the statutes governing
restitution. On April 24, 1996, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
("MVRA") became effective.213 This new act, which replaced the Victim
and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), 2 14 dramatically changed the law
concerning restitution. Under the VWPA, the sentencing court must
determine whether a criminal defendant has the ability to pay restitution.21 Failure of the court to make such a determination will result
in a reversal. In United States v. Fox, 218 the district court imposed
restitution under the VWPA without determining whether defendant had
the ability to pay restitution. 217 The Eleventh Circuit reversed because
it did not appear from the record that defendant had sufficient financial
resources to pay the restitution.2 8 Similarly, in Exarhos the court

208.

Id.

209. Id.
210. United States v. Mejia, 154 F.3d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 1998).
211. United States v. Alborola-Rodriguez, 153 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1998).
212. United States v. Biro, 143 F.3d 1421, 1431 (11th Cir. 1998).
213. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.A.). The particular provision relating to restitution is codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664
(West Supp. 1998).
214. Pub. L. No. 97-291,96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.A).
215. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3580(a) (West 1985).
216. 140 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998).
217. Id. at 1385.
218. Id. at 1386.
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held that restitution may be imposed under the VWPA even if defendants are virtually indigent at the time of sentencing. 219 However, the
court remanded this case and directed the district court to reconsider the
restitution order with regard to setting restitution in the amount that
defendants could feasibly be expected to pay.22
The MVRA does not require the sentencing court to determine a
defendant's ability to pay before imposing restitution. In fact, under the
MVRA the court must impose restitution in the full amount of the
victim's losses regardless of defendant's ability to pay.22 ' This significant change in the law has spawned challenges to the applicability of the
MVRA.
In United States v. Siegel,222 the Eleventh Circuit held that application of the MVRA to criminal conduct occurring before April 24, 1996,
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.223
Thus, the VWPA is still viable as it applies to all cases in which the
criminal conduct occurred before April 24, 1996.224 This highlights the
need to object to the imposition of restitution at sentencing and request
that the district court make a determination on the defendant's ability
to pay restitution in all cases where the criminal conduct occurred before
April 24, 1996.
4. Part G: Implementing the Total Sentence of Imprisonment
The Eleventh Circuit dealt with the issue of concurrent versus
consecutive sentences under section 5G1.3 in United States v. Blanc.25
In deciding whether two or more offenses are part of the same course of
conduct or a common scheme as the offense of conviction, the court held
that defendant's two fraud convictions were separate and distinct.2
Thus, consecutive sentences could be imposed for each offense pursuant
to section 5G1.3(b). In so holding, the court found that the earlier fraud
charge did not constitute relevant conduct under sentencing guidelines
that would have mandated a concurrent sentence with the later fraud
charge.2 27 The court further held that any activity that meets the
relevant conduct definition must be fully taken into account when

219. 135 F.3d at 732. For additional discussion of Exarhos, see supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
220. 135 F.3d at 732.
221. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A).
222. 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998).
223. Id. at 1260.
224. Id.
225. 146 F.3d 847 (11th Cir. 1998).
226. Id. at 854.
227. Id.

1999]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1057

determining whether the guideline governing the concurrent sentencing
with prior undischarged term of imprisonment applies.228
5. Part K: Departures
Perhaps in response to Koon v. United States,229 or perhaps just in
response to the increasing severity of the sentencing guidelines,
defendants have been presenting the Eleventh Circuit with creative new
requests for downward departures. The Eleventh Circuit's reaction has
been generally conservative.
In Webb the court determined that a district court has the authority
under section 4A1.3 to depart downward based on an overstated criminal
history for a defendant who has been classified as a career offender." 0
Although this was a matter of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit,
all other circuits that have considered the issue have granted the
departure.23 '
On another issue of first impression, the court ruled against a
downward departure. In United States v. Willis, 2 2 the court held the
district court may not depart downward in order to reconcile the
disparity between federal and state sentences among co-offenders.233
In Miller the court reversed another downward departure.2 4 In this
computer pornography case, the district court found that defendant
suffered from an impulse disorder that constituted diminished mental
capacity under section 5K2.13.235 In finding that the facts of this case
fell within the heartland of cases regulated by the sentencing guideline,
the appellate court stated: "Many offenders commit crimes because they
have poor impulse control. An impulse control disorder is not so atypical
or unusual that it separates this defendant from other defendants."2 36
The court also found that the facts of the case did not sufficiently link
the disorder to the offense as required by section 5K2.13.237 The court

228. Id. at 851.
229. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
230. 139 F.3d at 1396. Although the departure in this case was pursuant to U.S.S.G.
section 4A1.3, it is mentioned again in this section because it is indicative of the Eleventh

Circuit's trend in handling departures. For additional discussion of Webb, see supra text
accompanying notes 181-84.
231. 139 F.3d at 1395.
232. 139 F.3d 811 (llth.Cir. 1998).
233. Id. at 812.
234. 146 F.3d at 1286. For additional discussion ofMiller, see supra text accompanying
notes 75-78.
235. 146 F.3d at 1284.
236. Id. at 1285.
237. Id. at 1286.
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reasoned: "The experts' testimony merely showed that the impulse
control disorder explained (defendant's) interest in adult pornography,
but it failed to establish that the disorder caused him to trade child
pornography, which is the offense for which he was being sentenced."2 3 In reversing the departure, the court left open the question
of "whether an impulse control disorder alone, not caused by a disorder
affecting the ability to reason or process information, constitutes
diminished capacity."23 9
In United States v. Sanchez-Valencia,240 defendant appealed the
district court's refusal to depart downward based on "cultural assimilation" when sentencing a defendant for illegally re-ehtering the United
States. 241 The court of appeals affirmed, reiterating that a trial court's
discretionary decision to depart downward is not appealable unless the
refusal was based on an erroneous belief that the court did not have the
statutory authority to depart from the guideline range.242
Conversely, in United States v. Tomono,24 a turtle smuggling case,
the district court faced a creative departure request and granted a threelevel downward departure that was based upon the "cultural differences"
between the United States and Japan.244 The Eleventh Circuit
vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. 245 Although the
appellate court did not foreclose any future downward departure based
on cultural differences, it held that "[gliven the record before us, we
cannot say that the circumstances identified by the district court are
significant enough to take this case out of the heartland of the guidelines."246 The dissent took a different approach, stating:
[tihe issue is whether the district court abused [its] discretion. I
believe that the integrity and purpose of the sentencing guidelines
require appellate courts to be slow to encroach on the discretion given

to the sentencing courts ...we should not substitute our own

judgment unless a district court has abused its discretion.247

Although section 5K1.1 departures based on substantial assistance to
the authorities have not been at the forefront of the 1998 Eleventh

238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
148 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1998).

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 1274.
Id.
143 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1403.
Id. at 1405.
Id. at 1404.
Id. at 1405 (Roney, J., dissenting).
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Circuit decisions, their postsentencing corollary, motions for reduction
of sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), have been.
In 1997 the Eleventh Circuit strictly construed these provisions as they
relate to each other. In United States v. Alvarez,24 the Eleventh
Circuit stated, "U.S.S.G. [section] 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b) work in tandem
to give the Government two opportunities to reward a defendant's
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of others.
Section 5K1.1 addresses cooperation before sentencing while Rule 35(b)
addresses cooperation after sentencing."249 The court concluded, "Rule
35(b) cannot be used to reflect substantial assistance rendered prior to
sentencing .... " 2 o This problem was remedied effective December 1,
1998, when Rule 35 was amended to add: "In evaluating whether
substantial assistance has been rendered, the court may consider the
defendant's pre-sentence assistance. " 251
Now the Eleventh Circuit is strictly construing the one-year deadline
on filing the Rule 35 motion. In United States v. Orozco,252 the court
held that for any information which a cooperating defendant knows
either before sentencing or within one year of sentencing, the Government must file the Rule 35 motion within one year of the defendant's
sentencing. 2 The court held that if the Government fails to file the
Rule 35 motion within the one-year time period, the district court loses
jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 35 motion after that point. 2" Thus, in
those cases in which the defendant promptly proffers substantial
information to the Government either before sentencing or within the
year after sentencing, if the Government does not file the Rule 35 within
one year of sentencing, the defendant is unable to obtain relief.
F

ChapterSix: Sentencing Procedures and Plea Agreements

1. U.S.S.G. Section 6A1.3: Resolution of Disputed Factors
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing as long as
the information the court relies on is "reliable."255 Thus, many critical
guidelines decisions are based on hearsay evidence. For example, in
Anderton the court held the district court properly relied on a state child

248.

115 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 1997).

249.

Id. at 842.

250. Id.
251. FED. R. CRiM. P. 35(b).
252. 160 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1998).
253. Id. at 1316-17.
254. Id. at 1317.
255. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3.
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abuse investigator's hearsay testimony in departing upward on the basis
of sexual exploitation of the minor because the sentencing court had
found this testimony credible and reliable.2" In Exarhos the court
held the district court erred in failing to consider reliable hearsay
evidence showing that defendant stole other cars, which should have
been included as relevant conduct under sections 2B6.1 and 2F1. 1.267
G.

Chapter Seven: Violations of Probationand Supervised Release

In United States v. Quinones,2" defendant was sentenced to prison
and a subsequent term of supervised release. While serving his prison
term, he pleaded guilty to another crime in a different federal district
and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment and supervised release that
were to run concurrently with the first sentence of imprisonment and
supervised release. Upon release, defendant committed another offense.
Both terms of supervised release were revoked, and defendant was
sentenced to eighteen months in prison for each violation. The terms of
imprisonment, however, were ordered to run consecutively for a total
sentence of thirty-six months. 259 The Eleventh Circuit held that 18
U.S.C. § 3584(a)2 1 gave the district court the discretion to impose
upon revocation of two concurrent
consecutive terms of imprisonment
261
terms of supervised release.
III.

CONCLUSION

In 1998 the Eleventh Circuit was faced with many issues of first
impression concerning the sentencing guidelines. With the increased
application of sentencing enhancements, criminal defense practitioners
are likely to continue to litigate creative avenues for less severe
sentences in 1999.

256. 136 F.3d at 751.
accompanying notes 70-74.

For additional discussion of Anderton, see supra text

257. 135 F.3d at 730. For additional discussion of Exarhos, see supra text accompanying notes 12-14, 219-20.
258. 136 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 1998).
259. Id. at 1294.
260. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3584(a) (West Supp. 1998).
261. 136 F.3d at 1295.

